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Abstract 
In the present paper we describe the structure of the Chinese health care system and 
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of an aging population, increased privatization and increased inequity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the late 80ies the Chinese government launched a major reform of the social insurance 
system, including reforms of pension- and health care schemes. This reform has had a 
huge impact on the organization of the entire public welfare system. It has been 
implemented using a series of local experiments, of which particular models have been 
selected for national implementation. The system is constantly changing trying to respond 
to current financial problems and adapt to the need of the population.  
 
Despite many efforts, the general impression of the population as well as the governing 
authorities is that the reform has not been successful.1 Cost inflation has been difficult to 
control and the huge inequality in access seems to be further increased. On top of this, the 
reform process itself has made the population confused and uncertain about their rights in 
the system and when adding that the lack of regulation makes the system more exposed to 
corruption this distrust only becomes worse. 
 
China is a country with huge regional differences. It is therefore questionable whether it 
makes sense to talk about one coherent system or whether one should more likely consider 
the system as several co-exiting subsystems – subsystems that seem to be related to 
different groups of people as well as differences in geographic location. Moreover, any 
empirical analysis of the Chinese health care system will suffer from considerable data 
uncertainties and often even a crucial lack of relevant data.   
 
Nevertheless, there have been many previous papers aiming to describe the Chinese 
health care system and its reforms, e.g. Hsiao (1995), Yip and Hsiao (1997), Hu et al. (1999), 
Hu (2004), Blumenthal and Hsiao (2005) and the recent survey by Eggleston et al. (2007). 
The present paper follows up on these works describing and analyzing the present 
structure and organization of the Chinese health care system. We try to identify the root of 
the main problems with the current system, and discuss these in relation to the immense 
                                                 
1
 See e.g. Development Research Center of the State Council & WHO (2005). 
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future challenges of the system such as an aging population, increasing privatization and 
greater inequalities.  
 
We focus in particular on the burden sharing and provider incentives. Concerning the 
burden sharing issue we find that the actual level of risk sharing is relatively low and in 
reality people are left to cover the main part of their health care expenses by themselves, 
which again creates huge inequalities in access to health care among the population. 
Moreover, provider incentives seem to intensify this problem by creating substantial cost 
inflation.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a general description of the Chinese health 
care system: The overall organization, the financing, the allocation of health care benefits, 
and a description of the providers including their incentives. Section 3 summarises the 
main problems exposed during the analysis in Section 2, and finally Section 4 concludes 
with some considerations on future challenges of the Chinese health care system. 
 
 
2. The Chinese Health Care System 
 
In connection with China’s economic reforms in the early 80ies the health care system 
went from an old style communist system with the central government as owner, sponsor 
and provider to a system where the central government plays a much more limited role. 
The responsibility for financing and administering the health care sector was mainly 
transferred to the local authorities of the different provinces. Financing the services 
therefore became dependent upon local taxation paving the way for substantial 
inequalities between rich costal regions and poor rural regions. By reducing the public 
financial support, the providers in the health care sector were also forced (and allowed) to 
earn profits on specific types of treatments and drug sales introducing various moral 
hazard issues, which, much like in the U.S., resulted in a significant cost inflation and 
further inequality in access, see e.g. Blumenthal and Hsiao (2005) .   
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The current health care system, which is the result of a series of health care reforms and 
local experiments in the 90ies can be characterized by an overall structure as illustrated in 
the flowchart of Figure 2.1 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Chinese health care system 
 
Basically, the system design builds on a separation of the population into three groups 
called A, B and C according to job functions. The A-group consists of staff in all levels of 
government, the “parties”, NGO-like groups, public organizations, the army, staff in the 
public health sector and research institutions as well as in the education system (including 
university students). This group is regulated by the “public health service administration 
act” from 1988. The B-group consists of staff in all kinds of enterprises in urban areas 
(regulated by “the decision of the state council about construction of comprehensive 
medical care scheme among urban workers” from 1998) while the C-group consists of 
population in rural areas not covered by any specific regulation. A very small subset of 
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those in the C-group is under “new rural cooperative medical care scheme” – typically 
farmers located around the south east part of the costal area.  
 
There is no official statistic that accounts for the relative sizes of the three groups A, B and 
C, but a rough estimate (based on the estimate of Central Party University, reports from 
the Labour and Social Security Ministry, and the National Bureau of Statistic of China)2 
seems to indicate that group A, B and C respectively, represents approximately 5, 11 and 
64 pct. of the total population. 
 
Traditionally, Chinese researchers have considered the system as consisting of two 
separate parts, an urban and a rural system. In this sense it can be linked to the so-called 
“hukou”-system - a population registration system where people are classified according 
to their geographical location. The A and B group is for people with city-hukou while the 
C-group is for people with rural-hukou. However, the individual hukou-status may 
change in connection with job changes. For instance, if a student with rural hukou moves 
to a city university he/she will receive a temporary city-hukou which may become 
permanent if this person gets a job in the city after graduation – but there are also many 
instances where people with rural hukou is actually working in the city industry without a 
hukou change. As we shall see, this mix up between job function and hukou-status often 
leaves weak groups of the population uncovered by the health care system.  
 
                                                 
2 According to Zhou Tianyong from Central Party University the number of A group members is 
approximately 70,000,000 (see Control the Personal Inflation of Civil Servants in China News 2005  
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/news/2005/2005-06-12/26/585502.shtml 
(in Chinese). 
According to the Annual Statistic Report 2005 from the Chinese Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the 
number of actually covered B-group members is 137,830,000. Finally, according to the 5th Nation Population 
Census by the National Bureau of Statistic of China, the number of (theoretically covered) C-group members 
is 807.39 million, i.e. the total size of the rural population. 
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We emphasize the difference between A and B-group for several reasons: First, each of the 
three groups are actually regulated by a different ministry; China National Labour Union 
and the Ministry of Organization are responsible for the A-group, The Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security for the B-group, and Ministry of Health for the C-group. Second, on 
top of the difference in job function (public sector employees versus industry employees) 
there is a huge difference in their actual health benefits. Third, the actual relative size of 
the A group implies that they cannot be ignored as an independent group. However, 
insisting on treating A and B groups as independent (for the reasons mentioned) implies 
that many of the official data sources are difficult to fit into our framework and we shall 
mention specifically whenever this is the case.  
 
For group A, all health care expenses are basically fully covered according to the 1988 
regulation. However, the government has announced that there will be a gradual change 
of the conditions of the A-group towards a system more like that of the B-group, but up to 
now they have managed to maintain their “old” privileges (see also Section 2.1. below).3  
 
For group B, which is under the “urban comprehensive medical care scheme”, the system 
is more complicated. Basically, the system is designed as an employer-based insurance 
scheme4 consisting of both an individual account and social pooling where it is intended 
that the individual pays 2% of the gross income5 to his/her personal account and that the 
enterprise pays in total 6% of the individuals income of which 30% is allocated to the 
individual account and 70% is allocated to the social pooling6. However, in effect the 
                                                 
3 Source: Opinion about Medical Care Subsidy of Civil Servants, Ministry of Labour and Social Security and 
Ministry of Finance, Office of State Council, May 20, 2000.    
4 As argued in Dong (2006) this scheme is inspired by the Singaporean medical savings accounts model, 
which was implemented in Singapore in 1984.   
5 In fact, typically individuals do not have to contribute to the individual account if their wage is below 60% 
of the local average wage and they only have to pay a maximum of 2% of 3 times the local average wage in 
case their income is above this amount. Both the average wage and the actual upper and lower thresholds 
vary among provinces and may be used as a means to control health care expenses. 
6 These contribution rates may vary between regions according to the general economic situation.  
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implementation of this scheme varies a lot between wealthy costal provinces and the rest 
of the country as well as between enterprises with different types of ownership. For 
instance, typically unskilled labour in privately owned enterprises are not covered by this 
type of scheme even though they are under the same regulation – this happens without 
local government sanctions although the policy seems to be changing on this issue.7   
 
For group C there is no universal coverage, but there are various local initiatives trying to 
establish voluntary insurance schemes especially in the rich costal provinces. The main 
problem being that people are typically too poor to join these schemes and among those 
who actually join there is a large element of adverse selection as discussed in Wang et al. 
(2006).  Usually the funds involved are very small and therefore these schemes have a 
limited effect.  Moreover, around 100 million farm workers (with a growth rate of about 5 
million per year according to Xinhua News 2005)8 actually work in the city industry and 
consequently should be enrolled in the scheme for the B-group, but in reality these 
workers are left uncovered.  
 
The main structure of the general institutional setting is shown in figure Table 2.1 below. 
In short, there are three layers of government: central government, provincial government 
and city government. The central government is responsible for the general system design 
and for formulating policy and reform programs. The central government does not 
perform any direct reallocation of tax revenues, but there is some element of vertical 
transfers of funds to provinces in need of extra resources for their health care programs. 
The size of these funds is based on a bargaining procedure between the central 
                                                 
7 Cf. e.g. Announcement about Further Expansion of the Basic Medical Insurance Coverage, Wuxi City Labor and 
Social Security Bureau, Wuxi Labor and Social Security Net, March 9, 2002  
http://www.wxlss.gov.cn/html/2002-03/2339.htm 
See also Announcement about Further Expansion of the Basic Medical Insurance Coverage, Chongqing City Labor 
and Social Security Bureau, Health Chongqing Net, July 12, 2003 
http://www.jkcq.com/zcfg/ybzq/200611/765.html. 
(both in Chinese) 
8 http://www.cott.org.cn/newsdetail.cfm?iCntno=4140 (in Chinese) 
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government and the provinces. The provincial governments collect their own tax revenues 
and administer the health care plans. They further share the responsibility with the city 
government for providing the services. However, it is quite normal in provinces with very 
heterogeneous conditions to arrange the social pooling at a city level.    
 
 
 
 
2.1 Financing the Health Care System 
 
Loosely speaking, the costs of running the Chinese health care system are financed by 
three main parties; the government, enterprises and individuals. The costs of government 
concern all levels of government, which are mainly covered by taxation but also by 
various sorts of user fees. Lately, however, the government has been in search of new 
sources of income, for instance, the public welfare lottery also contributes to health care 
financing. Moreover, local governments in rural areas typically make use of various types 
of fees when financing their health care initiatives. In China tax revenues primarily comes 
from income tax, turnover tax and sales tax on enterprises. Enterprises include both state 
owned, collectively owned9 and private enterprises. Immediately after the reform, mainly 
state owned enterprises paid their share of the basic medical care scheme (for the B-group) 
                                                 
9 Collectively owned enterprises are mainly found in the rural areas for historic reasons. 
9 
but lately the government seems to emphasize active participation also of the private 
enterprises.10 Finally, in the current Chinese health care system individual payments play 
a huge role. Although, the individual contribution to the social scheme is rather limited 
there is a huge additional out-of-pocket expense for the individuals since the social 
schemes are inadequate to cover all necessary expenses.  
 
 
The total expenses of the current health care system as well as the allocation between 
government, social funds and personal expenses, is shown in Table 2.1.1. below.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Cf. e.g. Announcement about Expansion of Social Insurance Coverage in 2004, Tianjing City Labor and Social 
Security Bureau, Tianjing Policy News March 31 2004. 
(http://www.tjzb.org/system/2004/08/09/000044206.shtml) 
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Total expenditure has increased considerably during the last two decades (with a factor 13 
in fixed prices) which may be seen as a consequence of the health care reform itself as we 
shall discuss in Section 2.3.2 below (see also Blumenthal and Hsiao 2005). Expenses in 
percentage of GDP have remained relatively stable due to China’s high growth rates. 
Moreover, there is a substantial difference between per capita expenses in rural and urban 
districts with urban expenses being four times higher than rural expenses - a ratio that has 
been relatively constant.  
 
As a result of the reform the relative size of government health expenditure as well as the 
social health expenditure (which includes expenses of state owned enterprises) has 
decreased significantly. The direct government expenditure dropped from 36.2% in 1980 
to 17.1% in 2004 while the social health expenditure dropped from 42.6% in 1980 to 29.3% 
in 2004.  Meanwhile the private out-of-pocket part has drastically increased from 21.2% in 
1980 to 53.6% in 2004. On top of this, individual contributions to the social health 
expenditure have been introduced.  
 
As indicated in Table 2.1.1 above, expenses of the A-group is divided according to 
whether it concerns civil servants or personnel of public institutions. For the civil servants 
health care expenses are registered under total government expenses, which primarily are 
covered by taxation. For personnel of the public institutions, the health care expenses are 
partly covered by the institutions themselves and are consequently registered under social 
health expenditure. 
 
A detailed picture for the B-group is presented in Table 2.1.2 below. The number of people 
included in this scheme has been steadily increasing since the first experiments in the early 
90ies until 2006 where a total of 157.3 million people are covered (with three times as 
many working as retired members). As mentioned earlier, the scheme consists of both an 
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individual account (with an income corresponding to 3.8% of the total liability wage11) and 
a social plan (with an income corresponding to 4.2% of the total liability wage) but the 
actual burden is 2% for the individual and 6% for the enterprise. Both the individual 
account and the social plans are administered by the provincial government. As shown in 
Table 2.1.2, the income is larger than actual expenses concerning both the individual 
account and the social plans hence creating a positive accumulation. However, the data in 
Table 2.1.2 are aggregate data and expenses for the social plans may differ significantly 
between regions. In particular, one might expect to find positive accumulation in rich 
costal regions whereas it is not unusual to find negative accumulation in poorer regions.   
 
Table 2.1.2.  New urban comprehensive medical care scheme (B-group)12 
              
 
Source: annual statistic reports 2001-2006 from the Chinese Ministry of Labor and Social Security. 
 
Concerning the C-group there is no universal coverage, but a series of local experiments 
under the “new rural cooperative medical care scheme”. In 2005 there was a total of 678 
experiments covering 176 million (22%) of the rural population with a total income of 
10.95 billion Yuan and a total expense of 6.18 billion Yuan. Of the total income, central 
government pays 10.24%, local government pays 47.44% and communities (social 
                                                 
11 See footnote 5. 
12 In principle, these data may include part of the A-group because officially some A-group members are 
regulated by the new urban medical care scheme but no official information is available.  
12 
network) as well as individuals pay 42.3%.  It seems that a large part of the central 
government expenditure is covered by income from the welfare lottery - until September 
2005 it contributed 300 million out of a total central government expenditure of 540 
million. Since the scheme is rather new the financing role of the central vs. the local 
government is still not clear and the central government is not committed to any formal 
arrangement with the provincial governments.  
 
Although we have data for total expenses covered for the C-group there is no indication of 
burden sharing and furthermore, additional out-of-pocket expenses are not registered. 
Consequently, it is very difficult to obtain a general picture of the actual burden sharing 
between farmers, communities and local government. However, in specific regions more 
detailed information is available as in the case of the Shandong province13. Here the 
provincial government designed the subsidy scheme according to the village 
government’s financial situation: for the five most prosperous areas (Jinan, Zibo, Dongyin, 
Weihai, Yantai) there is a provincial government subsidy of 8 Yuan per person per year, 
this subsidy is 24 Yuan for the six poorest areas and 12 Yuan for those in between. Since 
the total subsidy is 30 Yuan per person per year the village government covers the 
residual. Finally, the farmers themselves pay 10 Yuan per person per year to the village 
committees (social pooling at a community level). This scheme covers 40.63 million 
farmers (66.98%) with a total provincial government subsidy of 360 million Yuan. Hence, 
contrary to the B-group, where social pooling takes place at a city or provincial level, 
social pooling for C-group is limited to take place at a village level.  
 
Summing up, we are now able to produce an estimate of the burden sharing between the 
government, enterprises and individuals at a national level. Considering the burden we 
have data for both total health expenses and income for the social schemes. Since income 
of social schemes represent the actual expenses for individuals and enterprises we shall 
                                                 
13 Bureau of Health of Shandong province – 2006 data. 
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use these amounts along with direct out-of-pocket expenses and expenses for the 
government. In this way we obtain the allocation in Table 2.1.3 using 2004 data:    
 
 
 
Table 2.1.3 shows that the health care burden of the enterprises is rather modest compared 
to the individual burden. In a broader perspective, though, there has been arguments 
stating that the total social burden of the enterprises, which includes pension and 
unemployment insurance, is too high (around 30%), see e.g. Dongqiang and Lin (2004) and 
Ying (2004).   
 
 
2.2 Health care benefits 
 
Considering the B-group, the general principle seems to be that outpatient treatments 
(according to an official catalogue) are covered by the individual account and inpatient 
treatments (according to an official catalogue) are covered up to a certain limit by the 
14 
social insurance plan. The actual details concerning the coverage as well as the list of 
approved treatments and drugs vary among provinces. In order to control the actual 
expenses it is common that the scheme includes some upper and lower threshold 
determined by the local government, outside of which the individual is left to pay 
out-of-pocket. Moreover, the list of approved treatments and drugs may of course be used 
to control the total expenses of the system.  
 
It is worth noticing that rights are generally restricted to a particular province. Therefore, 
the individuals face a substantial transition cost since they can not use neither their 
individual account nor the social insurance across provinces. Consequently, in some 
regions with a high degree of migrate labor many of the workers only receive part of their 
benefits. For instance, in the Shenzhen city area, floating labor only joins the social pooling 
part of the scheme and therefore all outpatient visits are out-of-pocket expenses for this 
group.   
 
In some of the early experiments the so-called Liang Jiang type of scheme was used. Here 
there is no difference between inpatient and outpatient treatments but a specified payment 
channel defining when expenses (above a certain lower threshold) are covered by the 
individual account, social account and out-of-pocket: first the individual account covers 
expenses and if this is insufficient the individual will pay out-of-pocket up to a maximum 
of 5% of the average wage, then the social plans will reimburse a gradually decreasing 
percentage of the remaining amount. Originally this scheme was intended to limit the 
costs of health care by limiting the element of social pooling, but was criticized for 
introducing too heavy a burden on the individual. Therefore, today most provinces have 
changed to the system described above.    
 
Looking at the benefit side of the system, the A-group is basically fully covered. In 
particular, employees of public sector institutions are entitled to hospital bed expenses, 
medical inspection expense, drugs expenses, cost of treatments, operation fees, expenses 
from recovery services, first aid expenses, organ transplant expenses, etc. Note that, 
15 
because there is a difference between the way that the health expenses are financed 
between civil servants and personnel of other public institutions, there may, in practice, be 
differences in the coverage between these groups, but in principle they are entitled to the 
same benefits.  
 
As mentioned in Section 2.1 above, the conditions of the A-group are gradually changing 
and the Beijing area has been among the first to implement those changes. According to 
“The suggestion about implementation of medical care subsidy to the officials” from 2003, 
public servants who have been involved in the basic medical care system (including the 
retired and people who no longer work in the government after the government 
institution reform, but are still in the public servant personnel system) enjoy the benefits of 
the B-group and are entitled to additional subsidies, which cover expenses beyond the 
maximum limitation of the services included in the basic medical care drug and treatment 
catalogue, i.e., expenses paid by individual, which are below the deduction line and 
expenses of privilege treatment for high ranking officials14. Due to the subsidy, the level of 
compensation, in effects, equals that of free medical care15.  
 
For the C-group there are no uniform conditions. In some regions there is basically no 
coverage and in others, like in the case of Jiang Shan, where individuals carry the major 
part of the burden (i.e. 30 Yuan per year out of a total on 52 Yuan), there is some element 
of coverage. In particular, farmers receive 10% coverage of outpatient visits to town 
                                                 
14 In the Beijing area the public fiscal budget is only around 5% of total salary last year according to official 
documents but obviously cannot cover the full expenses. It seems that no reliable data on true expenses are 
available.  
15 In particular, inpatient expenses beyond maximum limitation, above 50 thousand per year are covered 
with 95% compensation. Expenses below 50 thousand per year are covered with 90% compensation. 
Individual burden of inpatient expenses (including individual account expenditure) are covered with 95% 
for retired officers and officers at the rank of Chief of Bureau and above, and with 90% otherwise. Outpatient 
expenses (including individual account expenditure) are covered with at least 90% compensation if the 
expenses exceed 1300 per year.  
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hospitals (treating only less serious cases) without limits. Moreover, they receive inpatient 
coverage for expenses above 500 Yuan with an increasing percentage of coverage in fixed 
ranges16.  
 
 
2.3 Health Care Providers 
 
In China, government owned city hospitals form the backbone of urban health service 
delivery. These hospitals are ranked at three levels according to medical criteria and each 
level again contains three classes. To some extent this ranking matches the three layer 
governmental structure presented in figure 2.2. That is, top hospitals are typically 
administered by the Ministry of Health and thereby financed directly by the central 
government, while level 2 and 3 hospitals are administered by the provincial government 
and so forth. Table 2.3.1 below shows the total number of hospitals (not just public 
hospitals) according to the three level ranking. There are a relatively small number of 
hospitals at top level while more than half are outside the ranking system.  
 
                                                 
16 20% in the range (500, 1000] Yuan, 35% in the range (1000, 2000] Yuan, 40% in the range (2000, 5000] Yuan, 
50% in the range (5000, 10000] Yuan, 60% in the range (10000, 20000] Yuan and finally 70% in range 20000+ 
with total maximum benefit level of 20000 Yuan. In case the individual chooses a higher level hospital these 
percentages decrease. The full details of the plan are available at www.cncms.org.cn 
.  
17 
 
 
At lower levels, like town or village, people are typically referred to a local community 
hospital or a medical care center. Table 2.3.2 shows the different types of providers along 
with the total number of visits in rural areas. Even though the number of medical 
institutions seems quite high these institutions are typically rather small and perform only 
a very limited range of treatments. In terms of capacity, the number of beds per 1000 
persons in hospitals and health centers is much higher in urban areas (3.56) than in rural 
areas (1.43).  
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For historical reasons many large state owned enterprises still operate their own hospital. 
The number of such hospitals is included in Table 2.3.1. In fact, due the historical 
development, ownership of hospitals and other types of medical institutions is not easily 
identifiable since many combined forms coexist. Table 2.3.3 below records the number of 
institutions according to ownership type. 
 
 
 
There is no system of General Practitioners (GP’s), but each individual chooses directly 
among appointed service providers. In urban areas patients typically go directly to a 
hospital outpatient department and this department performs the function of the GP. In 
19 
rural areas patients may also go to medical care centers. There is a possibility to be 
transferred within the system (both horizontally and vertically) in accordance to the needs 
of the patient, though in case of vertical transfers this means that the patient will receive a 
reduced coverage, see Section 2.2.  
 
To indicate differences in the type of treatment that is received in urban versus rural areas 
one might consider the general education level on hospital versus township health care 
centers as in Table 2.3.4 below. It is striking that only 3.8% of the personnel at hospitals are 
in fact physicians (with university master level and above) while the vast majority act as 
doctors but only have an education at BA level. Also, in the rural area health centers there 
are no professionally trained physicians.   
 
 
  
 
Considering the workload of physicians it appears that top hospitals produce more 
treatments and inpatient days than lower ranking hospitals (see Table 2.3.5 below). At first 
glance this seems counter intuitive since one might expect to find more complicated (and 
thereby more resource consuming) treatments at top hospital level. However, one 
explanation could be that patients have the option to go to a top hospital and do that in 
cases of standard treatments, which they can afford. Therefore, top hospitals perform a lot 
of minor surgery and other types of standard treatment.    
 
20 
       
 
Compared with many western systems it is furthermore striking that the every Chinese 
hospital have an integrated pharmacy taking care of the provision of drugs, although in 
the big cities, more and more independent pharmacies appear. The obvious moral hazard 
problems in this connection will be discussed in Section 2.3.2 below.  
 
Treatment and drug charges are highly regulated. For treatments on the approved list as 
well as all prescription drugs prices are regulated either by a fixed fee schedule or by a 
guided price determined by the government. In case of a guided price the government 
determines some upper limit for the markup (10 – 15% for drugs and 5% for 
high-technology procedures). Around 40% of the drug market is regulated. 
Non-prescription drugs are only market priced if not on the approved list. Market priced 
drugs account for the remaining 60% of the total drug market. Treatments not on the 
approved list are market priced like for instance, births.17 
 
 
2.3.1 Financing the service delivery  
 
                                                 
17 Cf. China Drug Control Law (from 2002) and China Price Control Law (from 1997). 
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Hospital income basically originates from three sources: government subsidies (primarily 
for covering fixed costs such as buildings, equipment and wages), patient out-of-pocket 
expenses and individual account payment and reimbursements from the social insurance 
plans.  
 
Concerning the reimbursements from the social insurance scheme, many hospitals went 
from a fee-for-service based reimbursement scheme to a prepayment scheme similar to a 
monthly budget after reforms in 199718. Based on what the hospital received in a given 
month the previous year they are pre-paid 90% of this amount in the current year with the 
promise of an additional 10% if the hospital maintain its quality level (according to the 
yearly quality review). Hospitals are further compensated ex post for unexpected cost 
factors according to an overall judgment. The specific details of the contracts are 
somewhat complicated, see Yip and Eggleston (2004). 
 
The prepaid scheme can be compared to the situation before 1997 where the 
reimbursements were based on fee-for-service. In order to compensate the hospitals for the 
reduced state subsidies following the economic reforms, hospitals were allowed to charge 
fees that exceeded average costs on certain types of high-technology tests and procedures 
as well as prescription drugs. As to be expected this led to serious cost inflation since it 
gave hospitals the incentive to overprescribe drugs and high-technology procedures. 
Basically, this is the reason for the present day structure of the insurance system and the 
provider payment reforms (the Hainan reforms) initiated in 1997.   
Yip and Eggleston (2004) demonstrate that the prepayment scheme apparently has had a 
positive effect slowing the rate of growth of expenditures, especially for expensive drugs 
and high-technology procedures.    
 
To obtain a general overview of income and expenditure data for hospitals consider Table 
2.3.6 below. It appears that on average medical treatment and drugs are equally important 
                                                 
18 Typically modelled over the Hainan experiment.  
22 
income generators for all types of hospitals, but typically (on average) profits are negative 
for medical treatments while they are strictly positive on drug sales (again independent of 
the type of hospital). Of course these numbers may conceal substantial differences 
between individual hospitals19 but the overall picture seems to be in line with the fact that 
the government regulates treatment prices below actual costs and that the hospitals are 
forced to compensate through profits made on prescription drugs.    
 
 
                                                 
19 To get an impression from an individual hospital we may consider the following case from Shaoxing city 
in Zhejiang province: Hospital income per year is 222,457,000 Yuan, which consists of medical income of 
54,520,000 Yuan, drug income of 99,107,000 Yuan and some (unspecified) residual income of 68,830,000 
Yuan. Compared to the average distribution (in Table 2.3.6 above) we see that drug income is particularly 
high constituting half of the total income. Meanwhile, hospital expenditure per year is 205,667,000 Yuan 
consisting of medical expenditure of 119,555,000 Yuan and drug expenditure of 84,488,000 Yuan, which are 
in accordance with the average picture in Table 2.3.6 above. Looking at average medical expense per 
outpatient (Yuan) the total amount of 135.80 Yuan is shared as 81.70 Yuan for drug, 20.30 Yuan for 
examination and 12.30 Yuan for diagnosis. Average medical expense per inpatient is 7610.90 Yuan which is 
shared as 3176.70 Yuan for drug, 406.30 Yuan for examination, 1633.60 Yuan for treatment and 550.40 Yuan 
for surgery. 
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2.3.2 Provider incentives 
 
To understand hospitals incentives it is necessary to understand the conditions under 
which they are actually working. To some extent, the public hospitals are independent 
units, but still receiving government subsidies primarily to cover part of their fixed costs 
(such as buildings and capital). Since the hospitals are not fully sponsored by the 
government they gain some freedom to pursue other than public interests. Meanwhile, the 
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hospitals are not privately owned profit maximizing entities so they actually end up being 
primarily pursuing staff interests; that is, not caring about cost minimization while still 
required to obtain a certain level of profitability. 
 
There are many indicators pointing towards the management of hospitals pursuing staff 
interests. For instance, various sorts of inefficiencies are often debated, such as a 
decreasing workload of doctors and low utilization rates of capital (beds and equipment) 
etc. (Wang, 2004) Moreover, it is commonly known that there is a widespread tendency of 
over-treating patients using too many (and unnecessary) drugs, high-technology tests and 
procedures. 
 
For example, in the Shandong province, a retired provincial government official (that is, 
A-group member), Wang Jie, stayed in a top ranking hospital for 22 days being treated for 
pneumonia. In the end he died and total charges reached the striking figure of 20,000 
Yuan.20 Interestingly, it turned out that he did not use all prescribed drugs since family 
members attained more than 100 unopened drug packages from hospital after his death. 
Medical records show that he was prescribed 171 different types of drugs and as the bill is 
paid per day the maximum charge for a single day reached 5576 Yuan.21 
 
Also, it is well known that patients usually pay so-called “red-bag money” to doctors 
treating their case (to be seen as very big tip meant to ensure good service) and doctors 
furthermore obtain commission from their drug sales. In fact, more than 90% of marketed 
priced drugs are sold with commission implying that the doctors have incentive to choose 
                                                 
20 For comparison, average yearly income is 16614 Yuan per capita in the urban area of Shandong province 
in 2005. Source: Statistic Yearbook of Shandong 2006, Shandong Statistic Information Net 
http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/tjsj/nj2006/NJ04/HTML/0415.htm 
21 A family member of Wang said, “it is hard for a person without medical knowledge, to tell which drug 
should be used. But it is obvious that doctors treat a given sickness with multiple drugs with the same 
curative effect.” Source: http://www.southcn.com 
 
25 
maximum commission drugs among those with the same curative effects. For example, a 
given tumor drug sold at a hospital pharmacy at price 2000 Yuan, includes actual expense 
for the hospital of only 100 Yuan and doctors commission of 500 Yuan – leaving both a 
good commission to the doctor and a good profit for the hospital.  
 
Both “red-bag money” and commission are examples of hospital management accepting 
that doctors are quite powerful in making their own production decisions pursuing their 
own interests. It could also be viewed as part of a motivating payment scheme chosen by 
the hospital, but in connection with low degrees of efficiency it seems more likely to be the 
result of the former. 
 
Together, inefficiency and employee power creates high production costs, which again 
pushes treatment and drug prices upwards. The highly limited state subsidies are further 
fueling this effect. Further, in competing for states subsidies as well as for general demand, 
hospitals further increase production costs since typically more subsidies and patients go 
to hospitals with a high level of service and technological equipment. The final result 
being that public hospital prices exceed private hospital prices. To finance the purchase of 
high-technology medical devises and buildings, hospitals typically have huge debts to 
state banks.22 Since the banks are also state owned the hospitals are reluctant to pay back 
their debts because in the end the government cannot justify closing down hospitals.  
 
Considering the relation between service provider and the social plans, the change from a 
fee-for-service scheme to a pre-payment scheme obviously has changed the incentives of 
the provider. Under fee-for-service the hospitals lack incentive to reduce overall 
production costs because the reimbursement is based directly on their activity level. 
Meanwhile, a pre-paid 90%-budget induces some element of cost-consciousness by 
                                                 
22 As an example cf. e.g. Huge debts of local public hospital in Dongbei area, Health News November 13, 2007 
http://health.sohu.com/20071113/n253230097.shtml 
(in Chinese). 
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introducing supply side cost sharing although in principle the 90%-budget limits the 
residual saving to a maximum of 10%. The positive effect on overall costs is also partly 
neutralized by the fact that hospitals face a ratchet effect in their efforts to save on costs, 
see Yip and Eggleston (2004).  
 
In case of the drug market, the fact that hospitals and pharmacies are integrated units 
strongly limits the effect of government price regulation. In general prices on drugs are 
considered to be too high due to the situation mentioned above. However, when the 
government tries to lower drug prices of market priced drugs, the room for 
pharmaceutical companies to give discounts to hospital pharmacies and doctors will be 
smaller. As a result of this, doctors tend to substitute to another type of drug and the 
pharmaceutical companies will respond by changing the drug (either changing name, or 
dosage, or package) so that it will appear as a new type of medicine which may be market 
priced again (until it ends up at the regulated list). This type of product change is difficult 
to disclose for the government price bureau. In fact, from 1998 to 2006 the government 
implements drugs price reduction 17 times without success.23 Average scope for price 
reduction increased from 15% to 40% and the loss for the pharmaceutical companies for 
each reduction amounts to billions of Yuan. 
Not surprisingly, the regulation of the drug market has lead to a headed debate in China 
where the pharmaceutical industry complain about loss of profitability and argues for free 
market prices, but the public opinion seems to be that prices are still too high and need 
more government regulation. 
  
 
3. Main Problems  
                                                 
23 Cf. The puzzle of 17 times No Effective Drug Price Deduction,  Xinhua Net 2005.10.31 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-10/31/content_3707704.htm 
(in Chinese) 
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Having been trough the main structure of the Chinese health care system it is clear that the 
system faces many acute problems and serious future challenges. Even though the system 
is constantly trying to adapt to population needs and improve its performance there is 
official recognition of fundamental problems like insufficient coverage and lack of 
expenditure control.24 The central government is aware of the necessity of increasing its 
investment in health care substantially; see e.g. Hsiao (2007). As we have seen above even 
official data seems to indicate rather serious problems, which further more tend to interact 
and create a complicated situation for the governing authorities.  
 
To briefly sum up, the main problems concern: 
 
Coverage: In effect the current system design excludes the poorest and most 
vulnerable groups, especially a large part of the rural population. However, 
the system seems to change towards an urban and a rural system (like now) 
but with global coverage including people outside the labour market – adding 
a new scheme to the B-scheme which includes children, unemployed etc. But 
there are no details about financing yet.25  
 
 
Pooling level: Even when people are covered there may still be problems 
related to the actual pooling level. Typically the individual and social 
accounts are city or region specific. This means that if a given person is 
covered in one city or region and moving to another he/she does not have 
                                                 
24 Cf. Four Most Serious Problems of China Medical Care Insurance Reform, Xinhua Net July 16 2005. 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/insurance/bxsd/20050706/17251767967.shtml 
(in Chinese). 
25 Cf. Policy Explanation from Ministry of Labor and Social Security: Establishment of Basic Medical Insurance 
System for All Urban Inhabitants, Xinhua Net July 25, 2007. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-07/25/content_6429758.htm (in Chinese) 
28 
the right to coverage in that city or region. Obviously this is a huge problem 
for the growing migrating labour force but in principle it concerns everyone.  
    
Limited access: Looking at who actually receives the benefits in the system it 
turns out that there are huge inequalities. In reality many people in need of 
medical services are left without the possibility of receiving help even though 
they are covered by the official system. This is because it typically requires 
considerable additional out-of-pocket expenses to receive medical care. Often 
insurance premiums are low resulting in limited benefit coverage, in terms of 
low reimbursement rates (20-30%) for both outpatient and inpatient services 
(see e.g. Hu 2004) and this creates highly limited access. Even official data 
indicates that there are serious problems. For example, the ratio between 
people who should receive a medical service but did not was 36.4% (in 1993) 
and has risen to 48.9% in 2003. In particular for rural areas this ratio was 
63.7% (in 1998) and has risen to 75.4% (in 2003) according to the third National 
Health Service Investigation by the Chinese Ministry of Health 2003.  
 
Provider efficiency: Due to price regulation and lack of a well-functioning 
referral system, patients prefer going to top ranking hospitals producing long 
waiting lists while at the same time there is free capacity in lower ranking 
hospitals. This obviously gives a bad utilization of the available capacity of the 
system. Moreover, at all levels of government, investment seems to be focused 
on top-ranking hospitals only to make the problem worse.  
 
Cost inflation: Because of price regulation combined with lack of public 
funding the hospitals are allowed to make a profit on certain high-technology 
treatments and drugs. Due to serious moral hazard problems hospitals have 
incentives to divert activity into profit giving areas creating substantial cost 
inflation.   
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Credibility problem: People (especially in rural area) are typically distrustful 
of the local government insurance fund management and worried that their 
insurance premiums might be diverted to other uses. Moreover, the central 
government launches many different experiments in different regions and 
nobody knows which system they will finally adopt. Obviously this creates 
much confusion as to the functioning of the final system and consequently 
some reluctance and distrust to the current one.  
 
 
The problems of coverage and pooling level are in many ways interrelated. One way of 
solving the coverage problem would be to organize the social pooling on a national level, 
which in effect leads to a national health care system. However, such a solution seems 
difficult to realize because of huge regional differences in China. For instance, in poorer 
regions the current system may not even be fully implemented and these regions will 
further typically lack the information systems necessary to make the health insurance 
plans operational. Therefore, in practice the system must consist of regional risk pooling. 
While it is relatively obvious that the individual accounts should follow people when they 
move between regions it is less obvious how the accounts connected with social pooling 
should be allocated and how the local authorities should cooperate on this issue. The 
credibility problem seems to increase these difficulties because people lack confidence in 
the current system, feel uncertain about future benefits, especially the ones who expect 
future migration among cities and are therefore reluctant to increase the coverage.   
 
The many instances of provider inefficiency push cost inflation and thereby aggravate the 
problem of limited access simply because few people can afford treatment as this typically 
requires too large additional out-of-pocket expenses. It is somewhat ironic that price 
regulation ensuring cheap basic treatment, which was meant to promote access, seems to 
have had the direct opposite effect due to wrong provider incentives.  
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4.  Conclusion and Future Challenges 
 
Looking at future trends, the Chinese health care system seems to face a substantial 
increase in demand. There are at least three main reasons for that.  
 
Firstly, the present coverage is very limited – even the most optimistic estimate is that the 
current system covers less than one quarter of the total population (Liu 2004) and since the 
government intent to change the system from being based on job function to being based 
on citizenship in urban areas this change alone in the number of people covered is likely to 
increase future demand.   
 
Secondly, the “one child policy” has at least two crucial effects, namely an aging 
population and a future inability of the family to take care of the elderly. Obviously an 
ageing population will demand more health care resources simply because elderly persons 
require more health care. Moreover, since the burden of the elderly will increase for the 
family household the younger members will no longer be able to take care of the elderly 
themselves. Therefore, they will be forced to outsource this function requiring the 
professional services of public and/or private nursing homes.   
 
Finally, with the rapidly growing middle class and good economic conditions in general, 
demand for quantity as well as quality of health care is likely to increase drastically.  
 
With the current problems of the Chinese health care system (e.g. lack of public funding 
and educated health care personnel) it is obvious that this demand increase can not be met 
directly by the public health care system. This leads to further substantial cost inflation 
and increased pressure on top ranking hospitals as well as increased pressure for the 
introduction of private providers. 
 
Moreover, the supply side faces a dilemma: on the one hand, public health care resources 
are obviously insufficient and most public hospitals are in urgent need of investments; on 
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the other hand, according to the current regulation, private capital is not allowed to 
invested in the public health care sector.26  
 
Solutions to this dilemma are fiercely discussed in China at the present moment. Typically, 
public hospitals would like to lease buildings and equipment financed by private capital 
but the private investors on the other hand want to be involved more directly in the 
running and management of hospitals.27 Especially foreign investors have shown great 
interest for entering the Chinese health care market ( for example, according to the survey 
of Chinese hospitals Holdings Ltd, there are approximately 60 billion US dollars of funds 
in attention to China's medical market).  
 
Facing the combination of the hospitals urgent need of increased funding and the 
substantial interest shown by private investors to enter the market given acceptable 
conditions, the Chinese government now seems ready for a process opening up for private 
capitalization. According of a former health minister the government intent to encourage 
foreign capital to enter various large city hospitals subject to a 70 % limit of ownership but 
no official plan is announced yet.   
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